TakeFromCaesar.US - BLOG/Testimonials


Welcome to TakeFromCaesar.US -

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July 8, 2014 email to AmericanLiberties.LLC@gmail.com -

Hi Dave, and good morning,

I live in the New England area. I was introduced to your research on title 26 and particularly section 83 by a very close friend who had joined your complaint to Congress.

Sadly, I am at a loss for words. When I was first introduced to your research I just dismissed you as another patriot nut-bag making bogus claims. But then I sat down and read a document that my friend had used for the DOJ's attempt to bring an indictment against him for failure to file. I was intrigued by the info contained in that document.

But after reviewing the cases and rereading the sections that you have sited, it was clear that I was very wrong. You are not one of those patriot nut-bags making some bogus claims.

I am so used to the patriot nut-bags making all these recommendations for filing this, or not filing that, or send this in or don't send that in. The IRS, with every new claim, just sits back, does their own research on that new issue presented by the new patriot nut-bag, and then waits to screw them and everyone that follows them.

This info is not some ridiculous assertion made by some patriot nut-bag looking to get rich on the ignorance of others who can't find the time to do their own research.

I, for one, was sick of all the claims being made by some of these so called gurus. I decided to start doing my own research into these claims of those nut-bags. I found that although some of the info that they had presented was good info, but that most of it was misinterpretations of the codes or case laws.

As you know, the government loves the misinterpretation of the codes and the case law. It just makes their lives so much easier, and makes it easier to screw you.

I am one of those that had researched the code, or thought I had done so. That is until I was introduced to your research. I can't for the life of me believe that I had missed this. I had been telling everyone in the group that we had to learn to read the words on the page and not just the page, that the terms used are the important part. I had even shown them the definitions of the terms "and," "any," and "property," by using Black's Law and other materials. It is not that I did not see or even look at the section before. It is just that, like so many others that claim to be researching the code, I just simply over looked it has having no consequence.

I made a decision to look into your research further and conduct my own research as well on this particular matter. To start off on the right foot I just ordered your manual as part of that research.

I'm so glad I was handed that document by my friend.

<name withheld>

*End July 8, 2014 email testimonial.

POST #1: Wednesday, April 16, 2014 - Introduction to TakeFromCaesar.US

Hello and welcome -

     The exciting insight into the true nature of America's Tax Code now available is nothing new. In 1988 David Myrland began studying tax law and can show in the simplest of terms that the basis for the authority the IRS claims as its own is a profoundly limited set of statutes from which the US government runs when challenged.
     In 1994 Mr. Myrland wrote a treatise to detail his conclusions and has used that treatise to prevent as many as ten indictments. To this day, April 15, 2014, nobody can claim to have come close to the depth and clarity of these conclusions. Can you imagine filing a brief against the US Dept. of Justice arguing only three statutory claims, only to have Ass't US Attorney Stephen Bass ask US Dist. Court for a protective order against the brief? Can you picture the court actually issuing a protective order against the brief? (See Walden v. US, #A-05-CA-444-LY US Dist. Court at Austin, TX (2005), Aug. 2, 2005 Order).
     Can you believe that no accountant, corporate payroll department, tax attorney, H&R Block, JK Harris, Ronnie Deutsch, or taxpayer advocate can advise you on the language of Tax Code § 83? Consider:

Cohn v. C.I.R., 73 USTC 443, 446 (1979): “Petitioners rest their entire case on the proposition that Elovich and Cohn and/or Mega were “independent contractors” and not employees of the Integrated and that, therefore, section 83 does not apply to the acquisition of the shares from Integrated. They rely on the legislative history surrounding the statute to support their proposition that section 83 was intended to apply only to restricted stock transferred to employees. Respondent contends that the words “any person” in section 83(a) encompass independent contractors as well as employees. We agree with Respondent. . . .  We reject petitioner’s argument. While restricted stock plans involving employers and employees may have been the primary impetus behind the enactment of section 83, the language of the section covers the transfer of any property transferred in connection with the performance of services “to any person other than the person for whom the services are performed.” (Emphasis added.) The legislative history makes clear that Congress was aware that the statute’s coverage extended beyond restricted stock plans for employees. H.Rept. 91-413 (Part 1) (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 200, 255; S.Rept. 91-552 (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 423, 501. The regulations state that that section 83 applies to employees and independent contractors (sec. 1.83-1(a), Income Tax Regs.). There is no question but that, under the foregoing circumstances, these regulations are not “unreasonably and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes.” Consequently, they are sustained. (cites omitted)”

Pledger v. C.I.R., 641 F.2d 287, 293 (CA5 1981): “The taxing scheme imposed by Congress more accurately reflects what taxpayer received as compensation than a scheme that taxes the taxpayer on merely a portion of the compensation.”

Alves v. C.I.R., 734 F.2d 478, 481 (CA9 1984): “The plain language of section 83(a) belies Alve’s argument. Section 83(a) applies to all property transferred in connection with the performance of services. No reference is made to the term “compensation.” Nor is there any statutory requirement that property have a fair market value in excess of the amount paid at the time of transfer. Indeed, if Congress had intended section 83(a) to apply solely to restricted stock used to compensate its employees, it could have used much narrower language. Indeed, Congress made section 83(a) applicable to all restricted “property,” not just stock; to property transferred to “any person,” not just to employees; and to property transferred “in connection with ... services,” not just compensation for employment. See Cohn v. Commissioner, 73 USTC 443, 446-47 (1979).”

Robinson v. C.I.R., 82 USTC 444, 459 (1984); “The legislative history of section 83 does not require the conclusion that the statute should be applied to tax-avoidance techniques only. To the contrary, the House and Senate reports specifically delineate transactions and transfers to which section 83 was not to apply and do not exclude from its purview contractual provisions that were not tax motivated.”

MacNaughton v. C.I.R., 888 F.2d 418, 421 (CA6 1989): “The Alves court stated that the plain language of section 83 belied this argument because the “statute applied to all property transferred in connection with the performance of services” and because no reference is made to the term “compensation.” Id. The court further concluded in Alves that “if Congress had intended section 83(a) to apply solely to restricted stock used to compensate employees, it could have used much narrower language.” Id. at 481-82. Upon consideration, we agree with the interpretation advanced by the Alves court and, therefore, join the Ninth Circuit in holding that section 83 is not limited to stock transfers which are compensatory in nature.”

*Concurring with Cohn, Alves, see Centel Communications Co. v. CIR, 920 F.2d 1335, 1342 (CA7 1990).

Klingler Electric Co. v. C.I.R., 776 F.Supp. 1158, 1164 at [1] (S.D.Miss. 1991): “Section 83(a) applies to all property transferred in connection with the performance of services.”

Montelepre Systemed, Inc. v. C.I.R., 956 F.2d 496, 498 at [1] (CA5 1992): “Section 83(a) explains how property received in exchange for services is taxed.”

Gudmundsson v. US, 634 F.3d 212 (CA2 2011): “At the heart of this case is I.R.C. § 83, which governs the taxation of property transferred in connection with the performance of services.”

I am unfamiliar with § 83.” Sayeth 20-yr. IRS Officer, Sue Besson, Aug. 2007 in US v. Raymond Gebauer, #2:06-cr-00122-JLR-1, US Dist. Court, Seattle WA (tax evasion criminal case).

     What excuse can the anti-tax and patriot movements, and the others, possibly have for knowing nothing about § 83? Can anyone of them claim to have even bothered to read the Tax Code? No. The publication you see on TakeFromCaesar.US was written in 1994 by Mr. Myrland, and updated (35+ new pages) in March 2014, and is devoted solely to § 83 - Twenty years ahead of everyone else, those who claim to know what the Tax Code says, those who claim to know how tax laws operate, and those who have a plan to take on the IRS. Can anyone really claim to be be an expert when they know nothing about the statute that "explains how property received in exchange for services is taxed"? No. Can you handle the truth? 
     All who seek to discredit Mr. Myrland's work has to start with their own interpretation of § 83 IN MEMORANDUM FORM to show that it allows the taxation of compensation for services. 
          It’s nice to meet you, it’s great to be here, and it’s great to offer you nothing but the truth as proven through the plain letter of the law, finally.

American Liberties, LLC 
Chris Chapman 

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POST #2: Wednesday April 24, 2014:

      To David Myrland - I received my copy of Code Breaker: The§ 83 Equation yesterday. In addition, I have begun my initial read and study of your Public Vehicular Travel Course. Awesome stuff!!!
      I have been in the “movement” for some 40+ years and I have invested much time and resources studying the garbage disseminated by the cast of characters who promulgate a magic formula by which one can gaining freedom from the endless expanding intrusion of government lackeys into our lives. Thank you for the aforementioned resourced which you have provide. I have taken many detours but I know know the truth in the adage, “When the student is ready, the teacher will appear.”

Best regards,



Email to a promoter of Myrland's work:

     I support your YRIITL website and your work. It is the most informative one and has the most credible speakers. David Myrland is the most knowledgeable person on the subject of IRS issues bar none. He proves it by his flawless speaking method and his regurgitation of statutes by paragraph and other identifying numbers and letters which corroborates the fact that he has actually done his due diligence and studied the material he presents to the audience. I have the utmost respect for David and all the rest of you that bring David to the forum.

Thank you!



POST #3: Thursday April 25, 2014:

From David R. Myrland:

It's a thorough waste of my time to reply to "Gary" who asked that I address the allegations below. His message reflects the brick wall so many have made of their brains, a rock so solid they cannot be reasoned with. I've seen it, I've seen it, and I've seen it. What Gary propounds is the reason I came to ignore "the movement" beginning as early as 1992; I never looked back.

The person who reads this doesn't have the benefit of knowing the points I covered on the conference call to which Gary has taken exception. All that Gary says comes from ignoring many points I covered, and misconstruing many other; he didn't listen closely enough. What's worse, he lacks the education necessary to the proper analysis of anything as complicated as the Tax Code and its provisions. Gary also lacks the TWENTY-SIX years I've spent studying the law, litigating on every federal and state level, criminal and civil, 5 for 6 against the State AG of Oregon, prevented ten tax indictments with my 1994 treatise, read over 4000 decisions (mostly federal), docketed 2 of 5 attempts in the US Supreme Court . . . No amount of expertise, experience, and/or proof, to say nothing of instruction, can cause the least of consideration in one who suffers as does Gary. I spent six solid years doing nothing but analyzing Tax Code provisions, regulations, and the IRS' standard operating procedures, comparing the IRS to tax provisions - nobody else has done this.

Understand, I made it abundantly clear that my findings are activated as soon as you've lost all of the arguments Gary points to as valid. For convenience alone, Gary groups my comments about law, from the conference call, with comments I made about mistakes made by certain self-proclaimed "experts." I'll point this out as I respond to different portions of Gary's diatribe.


Gary writes:

Dave's section 83 stuff is wrong... basically, the Labor property he claims he is "paying" for his wages, is considered a "lease" of property... read it and weep.


7701(e) Treatment of certain contracts for providing services, etc.
For purposes of chapter 1 -
     (1) In general.- A contract which purports to be a service contract shall be treated as a lease of property if such contract is properly treated as a lease of property, taking into account all relevant factors including whether or not-
     (A) the service recipient is in physical possession of the property,
     (B) the service recipient controls the property,
     (C) the service recipient has a significant economic or possessory interest in the property,
     (D) the service provider does not bear any risk of substantially diminished receipts or substantially increased expenditures if there is nonperformance under the contract,
     (E) the service provider does not use the property concurrently to provide significant services to entities unrelated to the service recipient, and
     (F) the total contract price does not substantially exceed the rental value of the property for the contract period.

Dave writes:

Tax Code § 7701(e) was/is examined in my 1994 manual on § 83 that was an exhibit in five actions taken all the way to the Supreme Court, and is was never referenced in any way by the IRS or DOJ as the reason they disagreed with my interpretation of § 83. The only way the gov't reasoned out of § 83 was to say that one does not pay for their labor before they sell, so all compensation they receive for their services is a profit. If § 7701(e) does what Gary says it does he has a job waiting for him at the DOJ who looked right at it many times and thought otherwise about it. The DOJ does not agree with Gary. The gov't looks at "any money or property" in regulation and arbitrarily excludes personal services for that reason, but wins four Supreme Court cases arguing that an arbitrary exclusion from "any property" is impermissible.

Until such time Gary offers a contrary interpretation of § 83 and offers his memorandum about both of these statutes, there's really too little substance to his comment(s) to warrant indulgence.

Gary writes:

Also, he (Dave) is wrong about Jurisdiction...there is more to Jurisdiction than subject matter jurisdiction, there is also the "District" wherein the "crime" has been committed. And the fact is that there are no Article III federal districts in the several states, the feds only have territorial jurisdiction which have absolutely no lawful authority in a State of the Union. This is proven by Ed Rivera at http://organiclaws.org and so the people at http://www.weissparis.com are not "Stupid" "Lunatics", it is everyone else who is confused.

Dave writes:

I never said this jurisdictional argument is wrong; hello? "Territorial jurisdiction" was proven as well as it could be many, many years before E. Rivera began researching jurisdiction. Knowing as I do, however, that the courts will penalize and mock any and all litigants who argue limited federal jurisdiction, and how the IRS will do the same, and knowing as I do, that some people die due to the stress of losing their homes, credit, jobs, bank accounts, reputations, and liberty by subscribing to the jurisdictional claims upon which Gary is so keen, knowing all of this justifies my advice that the argument simply NOT be made. Think about it, I have a memorandum from a US Dist. Court Chief Judge from 1992 that briefs the argument out of the water using North Carolina's state constitution itself to contradict the claim. Gary has to be able to out-write a Chief Judge a full 22 years after the claim was laid to rest.

The exception I took to Weiss' work is how US Tax Court's order of dismissal has been misconstrued as a victory. Tax Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the case brought by the petitioner - IT DID NOT rule that the government lacked jurisdiction over "non-resident aliens." Weiss totally blew the client's opportunity to petition Tax Court and now the assessment is final. (See 26 USC §§ 6211, 6212, and 6213). Way to go. I spent more than twenty minutes on this on the conference call; where was Gary.

Gary's comment about jurisdiction lumps three different discussions together - federal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and in personam jurisdiction. I'm not going to indulge federal jurisdictional claims because I don't want to have to out-brief a Chief Judge. If you fail to invoke the jurisdiction of a court it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. If statute, properly constructed and construed, does not reach you or your conduct, in personam jurisdiction is lacking. There's no way to tell what Gary is trying to say about jurisdiction. I argue in personam jurisdiction in relation to income tax matters; period.

Gary writes:

We need to be telling the truth, not more miss-representation of the deceptively written laws from a federal government that extends their tiny territory to the entire country by deceit and incorrectly interpreted by a puffed up know it all like Dave. If you want to wake up America get Adele Weiss on to debate the issue and defend himself instead of just letting Dave condemn him.... It is true however that Adele is wrong about a few things too, so we all need to pull together and learn the facts instead of crucifying each other on public forums.

Dave writes:

Listen to the peril Gary places me in by flying off the handle without the education to back up what he says, here. I'm accused of "misrepresentation" of what statutes say, and of being a "puffed up know-it-all." The gov't does almost everything by deceit. "Incorrectly interpreted" - Gary heard that the government asked for and received a protective order against my briefing of only three statutory issues in 2005. If I am incorrect, and IF Gary can prove it, the DOJ needs him desperately; Gary is the greatest tax attorney to ever live. If I'm incorrect Gary can provide a memorandum that proves it when, in fact, the government cannot.

I've represented my key findings in motions and rebuttals to IRS/DOJ opposition pleadings in civil and criminal actions in no fewer than ten cases, five of which all the way to the Supreme Court; the government's best are clueless. I know my treatise and much more like the back of my hand, and I have nothing in common with any of the "movement's" minions and their . . . There are fantastic and delusional claims, there are valid claims the government refuse to indulge, and then there are viable arguments that actually win some degree of respect, or remedy, or justice.

Beat that dead horse called federal jurisdiction, file those 1040NR's, incur those § 6702 frivolous filing penalties, because it certainly beats having to learn the law. The "movement" is ignorance-of-the-law school. I looked at notices of lien TODAY (April 25, 2014) that show how, many years after the last 1040NR was filed, the IRS is still living like a curse in the lives of a husband and wife here, in Seattle. Tens of thousands of dollars are outstanding because of "guru's" who have no clue about who they're challenging, or concern for the damage to estates, marriages, and lives and livelihoods they might destroy, merely for the sake of arguing their pet claims.

All I deal in is the truth. There's nothing to debate with anyone; I don't disagree. I argue other issues because my research led me to discover more than others know, because they didn't do the work. Why would I debate somebody who's never even read the Tax Code? If they know nothing of § 83 they have to admit that they've never even read the Tax Code, because if they had, surely they would have found § 83. Any questions.

Until the IRS issues a statement telling somebody that their balance owed for a particular taxable year is ZERO, the liability has to be presumed to still exist. Weiss' Tax Court order on his site clearly tells me, the educated reader, that the court ordered the petitioner to file a proper petition but was ignored; Tax Court's jurisdiction was never invoked. That's what it order of dismissal says, not that the federal gov't lacks jurisdiction over non-resident aliens. What I said about Weiss I said to protect others from being similarly victimized.

Gary writes:

Also, the http://www.escapeharassment.com/ folks are partially correct, the problem with the escape harassment process is that you cannot ever get it over with, it is truly a run, run and run some more process. It only address the mechanism by which they get their hooks into you. And requires some additional steps not clearly outlined. Adele's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is much better.

Dave writes:

"Partially correct"? I repeat - Lives, marriages, bank accounts, mortgages, reputations, the son's college fund - that's a high price to pay for somebody who's "partially correct"! Can Gary even hear himself? If "you cannot get it over with," what is the value? Inviting the IRS and federal government into your life through a process that never ends sounds like hell, not a solution. A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction that validates the underlying assessment as a final determination is not "better" than anything; it's worst case.

Gary writes:

But then you must also educate the rest of the idiots who might try to enforce administrative notices which have no lawful authority, same problem. This is truly an education process because the ones who are enforcing these unlawful orders on us are the ones we need to inform. We need to print up some good guideline proof documents we can hand to employers and banks.. these are the useful idiots.

Dave writes:

We need to be realistic, instead. It's not contract, it's not maritime jurisdiction, it's not administrative - it's corruption, racketeering, extortion, and conspiracy against rights. THE LAW (26 USC §§ 83, 212, 1001, 1011, and 1012) places the value of personal services in the category of cost, not profit. THE LAW (26 USC § 1) fails to implicate Americans (citizens of the United States) as subject to the ch.1 income taxes, but regulation (26 CFR 1.1-1) broadens the statute to implicate those citizens as subject. The courts won't even honor plain statutory language, what can you possibly gain by "educating" agency personnel? The courts always back the IRS no matter how many statutes they violate! This is the brick I alluded to in my introduction, where I stated that I was wasting my time by replying to Gary.

A lack of education, expertise, and experience in litigation and legal research, are Gary's, yet he's willing to essentially call me a liar when he offers no proof to the contrary. This is why I turned my back on the movement and refuse to indulge anyone who's not arguing tax statutes. When they're not wrong on fire, they're proceeding recklessly and without a care for the price others will pay for having believed what they hear.

Gary writes:

I would love to listen in on a study group that would pull Dave in with Adele Weiss, Ed Rivera, Dave DeRemer and Howard Griswald to get all these great minds discussing how to overcome the beast. You'll just need to tame Dave's big mouth first.

*End Gary's comment.

Dave writes:

Is any mouth pejoratively "big" when it seeks to preserve the normal and peaceful lives of people who might otherwise be damaged in the ways to which I've alluded, above? None of these people have their feet on the ground, as it relates to the Tax Code. In 2005 an IRS enrolled agent and accountant, since 1973, signed off on my treatise under penalties of perjury after verifying my reliance upon and interpretation of certain provisions.

Jurisdiction; so what! I learned the argument and moved on, choosing rather to argue inside-the-box by using statute only. When I can prove that the statutes protect property and state's rights, why would I argue anything else? I've got hundreds of Supreme Court decisions in favor of this approach, while these others arguing UCC, citizenship, contract / administrative, have no support in case law or only a smattering of decisions that often must be stretched out of shape before they appear to support the underlying claim. Where are these people going to be at the moment Gary says, "I got a notice of deficiency from the IRS"?

Get an accountant, start a home business, accumulate all the deductions H&R Block and your accountant say the IRS will allow, and view the amount you pay to stay out of trouble as your price of admission to the shouting match with your US Senators and Representatives. Everything else leads to liens and levies, right or wrong.

I'm the only who's done the work, so I have nothing to gain by sitting down with these others to whom Gary alluded. In profoundly short order I can run through their conclusions relative to income taxes, exposing them be shortsighted at best.

The 1992 memorandum on § 861 (nonresident alien claim) is below. I personally added Lowell Becraft's research found in footnote #3, and I personally briefed the third issue or "C" as my own view of § 861 - enjoy:

"As a nonresident alien to Washington, D.C., Tax Code § 861 provides that my compensation for my personal services is not to be included in gross income to be taxed."

This argument has always been rooted in negligence. In this brief, issues "A" and "B" dispose of "non-resident alien" claims made by a citizen of the United States (like me), and "C" disposes of the section 861 argument by showing that only "non-resident aliens" benefit from its provisions. It shows how a lack of respect for the complexities of the Tax Code can spell doom for all that you own once you get to court. While the DOJ thinks the argument is bogus, it has absolutely no clue why.

This is what you're up against when you seek a decision from a district court chief judge. Note how fundamentals and technical analysis of statutory language is all that's needed, in part "C," to humiliate the litigant Citizen and his § 861 argument.

Note how a logical and methodical analysis of statutory language was used instead of simply labeling the argument as "frivolous." The argument is soundly disposed of and, in addition, we get a very close look at the writing prowess of federal judges we face when we go to court against the IRS. As evidenced by this memorandum, nobody arguing § 861 has the ability to out-write and out brief one of these judges, for to argue it now clearly proves the inability to competently read and apply statute itself. Here, the simple language of the statute itself is used to destroy an argument.

*Begin memorandum on 26 USC § 861 -


     In a verbose complaint, with numerous attachments, Petitioner contends that his constitutional rights have been violated. Petitioner seeks a Temporary Restraining Order, Permanent Injunction and $25,000 in damages for alleged perjury on the part of IRS employee Officer Kreitzel, allegedly in the form of Kreitzel's statements regarding the citizenship of the Petitioner.
      He has filed a Financial Affidavit and seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. When considering a complaint accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, a district may rule that process should not be issued if the complaint is malicious, presents an indisputably meritless legal theory, or is predicated on clearly baseless factual contentions. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F. 2d 772, 774 (CA3 1989). Indisputedly meritless legal theories are those "in which either it is readily apparent that the plaintiff's complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or that the defendants are clearly entitled to immunity from suit." Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (CA3 1990) (quoting Sultanfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277, 1278 (CA11 1990)).
     The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that, "the plain meaning of 'frivolous' authorizes the dismissal of in forma pauperis claims that…are of little or no weight, value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or trivial." Deutch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (CA3 1995). It also has been determined that "the frivolousness determination is a discretionary one," and trial courts "are in the best position" to determine when an indigent litigant's complaint is appropriate for summary dismissal. Denton, 504 U.S. at 33.
     After consideration of the Application to Proceed in forma pauperis, the Petition and documents attached, the court concludes that the action is frivolous. Federal courts, as a general rule, are unwilling to disrupt state court proceedings, as in the instant case where Petitioner, in addition to his request for damages, also seeks injunctive relief. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 34-45 (1971). Adherence to this long standing principle yields the conclusion that Petitioner's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, lacks an arguable basis in law, and, therefore, the action shall be dismissed as frivolous.
     Upon due consideration of Petitioner's claims purportedly arising out of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and over their perceived constitutional limitations on federal authority in the several states, this court has concluded petitioner's complaint is frivolous and without merit and should therefore be dismissed.

A. North Carolina as foreign state.

     Petitioner claims that Respondent may enforce neither the Code nor the Summonses against him because he is a citizen of the State of North Carolina, "a foreign state with respect to the 'United States,' and . . . therefore . . . and area 'abroad' or outside the 'United States.' This [i.e. North Carolina] is also considered a foreign country for U.S. revenue purposes." Motion to Vacate at 3-4. Apparently, as a citizen of the "foreign country" of north Carolina, Petitioner neither resides in nor is a citizen of the United States of America. As a result, Petitioner claims that he is not subject to an internal revenue tax, the Code, the Collection Summonses issued by Agent Kreitzel pursuant to § 7602, or the territorial jurisdiction of the Untied States. See id. at 4. No authority is cited by Respondent for this conclusory allegation of North Carolina's Foreign sovereignty.
     Although the concept of federalism recognizes the dual sovereignty of the State of North Carolina and the United States of America, North Carolina is indeed on of the fifty states constituting the United States of America. (footnote 1). See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-91 (1947); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604-05 (1889); U.S. v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550 (1876); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 380-83 (1821). "This State shall ever remain a member of the American Nation; there is no power on the part of this State to secede . . . ." N.C.Const.Art.I, § 4. "Every citizen of this State owes paramount allegiance to the Constitution and government of the United States, and no law or ordinance of the State in contravention or subversion thereof can have any binding force." Id. at Art.I, § 5. "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S.Const.Amend. XIV, § 1. Incidentally, see 26 CFR 1.1-1(c).
     The fact that Petitioner is a citizen of North Carolina does not relieve him of the rights and obligations created by the laws of the United States, including the Code. Dennis v. U.S., 660 F.Supp. 870, 875 n.2 (C.D.Ill. 1987) ("[T]he taxing power of the United States of America extends to every individual who is a citizen or resident of this nation."); Sloan v. U.S., 621 F.Supp. 1072, 1073-74 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (Secretary may issue summonses to obtain information about ANY potential tax liability), aff'd. in part, dismissed in part, 812 F.2d 1410 (CA7 1987), aff'd. 939 F.2d 499 (CA7 1991), cert.den. ____U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 940 (1992); Channel v. U.S., No. C88-0118P(CS), 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16904 at *5 (W.D. Ky. August 9, 1988)(opinion by Magistrate Judge King). To paraphrase Justice Willis Van Devanter, when Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Sixteenth amendment, (footnote 2), adopted by the Code, it spoke for all the people and all the States, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of North Carolina as if the Code had emanated from the North Carolina General Assembly, and should be respected accordingly by the citizens and courts of the State of North Carolina. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912). See also, Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) ("The laws of the United States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are.") Such claims as to limitations on federal powers have repeatedly been struck down by the courts. (footnote 3). Petitioner's "foreign state of North Carolina" argument is patently frivolous, (footnote 4), and is hereby rejected as a basis for quashing the Collection Summonses in question.

B. Petitioner's Nonresident Alien Status.

     Petitioner also challenges Respondent's jurisdiction to serve the Collection Summonses and to assess a tax liability by asserting the nonresident alien status under 26 USC § 865(g)(1)(B). (footnote 5). The "nonresident alien" status is actually defined in 26 USC § 7701(b)(1)(B) as "[a]n individual . . . [who] is neither a citizen of the United States nor a resident of the Untied States (within the meaning of subparagraph (A))." See also 26 CFR § 1.871-2(a).
     Petitioner has failed to produce evidence demonstrating he is indeed a nonresident alien. First, as to Petitioner's citizenship, the record is void of evidence showing that Petitioner was born or naturalized somewhere other than the United States. U.S. Const.Amend. XIV, § 1. (footnote 6). Second, Petitioner's "Declaration of Status" does not constitute a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of United States nationality under 8 USC § 1481. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 260 (1980); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967); Kahane v. Secretary of State, 700 F.Supp. 1162, 1166 (D. D.C. 1988). (footnote 7). Third, Petitioner has failed to satisfy the "lawfully admitted for permanent residence," "substantial presence," or "first year election" residency tests under 26 USC § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i), (ii), and (iii), thereby precluding his qualification as a nonresident alien. Because Petitioner is admittedly both a citizen and a resident of North Carolina, and North Carolina is on of the United States, the Court can only presume, in the absence of any contradictory evidence, that Respondent is a citizen of the Untied States.
     Even if the Petitioner could demonstrate that he was a nonresident alien, he would still be subject to the Code's nonresident alien individual provisions, 26 USC § 871 et seq. The uncontested evidence presented at the hearing established that Respondent had substantial income from real estate business in Florida, another one of the United States, between 1980 and 1982. That would constitute taxable United States source income under 26 USC § 871. Furthermore, every nonresident alien individual . . . who is engaged in business or trade in the United States . . . or who has [taxable] income . . . shall make a return on Form 1040NR, . . . even though (a) he has no income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States, (b) he has no income from sources within the United States, or (c) his income is exempt from income tax by reason of an income tax provision or any section of the Code. (26 CFR § 1.6012-1(b). See also 26 CFR § 1.6015(i)-1(b) (requiring certain nonresident aliens to file declarations of estimated income tax). If, as set forth in his "Declaration of Status," Petitioner has no taxable United States source income, he may still be subject to taxation on income derived from sources OUTSIDE of the United States. 26 USC §§ 862, 863(b). Petitioner has failed to explain how, if he is indeed a nonresident alien, these provisions would be applicable to him.
     Finally, the IRS is entitled to use its authority under § 7602 to determine the accuracy of Petitioner's alleged nonresident alien status and any assertion that the Code's nonresident alien provisions do not apply to him. See e.g., Kis, 658 F.2d at 537; Sloan, 621 F.Supp. at 1074. The Court concludes that Petitioner's claim does not constitute grounds for quashing the Summons, and that Petitioner's claims of perjury on the part of Officer Kreitzel are unfounded.

C. Sources of gross income under 26 USC § 861.

     As directed by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), we employ the traditional tools of statutory construction to ascertain congressional intent regarding whether it intended to exclude from gross income the compensation earned by a citizen of the United States under 26 USC § 861. We begin with the basic proposition that agency power is "not the power to make law. Rather, it is `the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.' "Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) (quoting Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commission, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936)). "[I]t [is] the judiciary's duty "to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (Marshal, C.J.)." (footnote 8).
     Thus, our initial inquiry is whether Congress intended to exclude from gross income the compensation earned by a citizen of the United States, such as the Petitioner. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (stating that "[i]t is axiomatic that an administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress"); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16, 955 n.19 (1983) (providing that agency action "is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it; and if that authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review" and "Congress ultimately controls administrative agencies in the legislation that creates them").
     Applying the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Chevron, we examine whether Congress intended to exclude from gross income the compensation earned by a citizen of the United States under 26 USC § 861. Under Chevron, we first consider the intent of Congress because "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. It is only if the intent of Congress is ambiguous that we defer to a permissible interpretation by the agency. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
     The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language of the statute itself. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)). See also Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173-175 (1994). "It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the court is to enforce it according to its terms. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670, 671; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 33; United States v. Lexington Mill and Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409; United States v. Bank, 234 U.S. 245, 258." (footnote 9).
     "For taxation purposes, gross income includes "all income from whatever source derived." 26 USC 61(a). An accession to wealth, . . . is presumed to be taxable income, unless the taxpayer can demonstrate that it fits into one of the Tax Code's specific exemptions. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1985)." (footnote 10). Petitioner's statutory claims arise under 26 USC §§ 61(a) and 861. In pertinent part, § 861 reads:

Section 861. Income from sources within the United States.-
     (a) Gross income from sources within United States -
The following items of gross income shall be treated as income from sources within the United States:
     (3) Personal services- Compensation for labor or personal services performed in the United States; except that compensation for labor or services performed in the United States shall not be deemed to be income from sources within the United States if -
     (A) the labor or services are performed by a nonresident alien individual temporarily present in the United States for a period or periods not exceeding a total of 90 days during the taxable year[.]

     From this language it is clear to this court that Congress intended only the compensation of nonresident aliens to be excepted or excluded from gross income under § 861. With an understanding that regulations cannot deviate from statute, (footnote 11), and that statutory language governs, (footnote 12), we look to the language of applicable provisions for primary guidance. Indeed, without appreciable editing this provision clearly provides, "items of gross income from sources within the United States [includes] Compensation for labor or personal services performed in the United States; except . . . compensation for labor or services . . . performed by a nonresident alien individual temporarily present in the United States." See § 861(a)(3)(A). Having duly disposed of Petitioner's claim of nonresident alien status, this court must conclude that this statute expressly includes, rather than excludes, the Petitioner's compensation for services in gross income.
     This claim appears to arise from a strained, if not tortured, reading of 26 USC § 61(a) which lists items of gross income.

§ 61 Gross Income Defined.
(a) General Definition.-Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items . . .

     For reasons not disclosed by the Petitioner, Congress' express indication that the list in § 61(a) is comprised of "items" of gross income has gone ignored, and Petitioner has rather focused on the phrase "from whatever source", concluding in error that the list here is one comprised of sources of gross income and not "items" as indicated. While many regulations under § 861 are cited by the Petitioner in support of this claim, its origin being that of statutory misinterpretation makes any query into their content, for derogation or vitiation of, or deviation from statute, is unwarranted. Any challenge comprised of such regulatory provisions would fall to the plain language of § 861 itself.
     Petitioner compliments this claim with the traverse that the tax is not imposed by clear language, as due process would require, and that this is sufficient grounds for nullification of the Respondent's determination of tax liability. This court agrees that a tax must be imposed by clear and unequivocal language. Where the construction of a tax law is doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of whom upon which the tax is sought to be laid. (See Spreckles Sugar Refining v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 416 (1904); Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917); Smietanka v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 257 U.S. 602, 606, 42 S.Ct. 223, 224, 66 L.Ed. 391 (1922); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 577 (1929); Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 51 S.Ct. 49, 75 L.Ed. 156 (1930); Burnet v. Niagra Falls Brewing Co., 282 U.S. 648, 654, 51 S.Ct. 262, 264, 75 L.Ed. 594 (1931); Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 508, 52 S.Ct. 260, 262, 76 L.Ed. 422 (1932); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469, 55 S.Ct. 266, 267, 79 L.Ed. 596 (1935); Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938); U.S. v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1978); Security Bank of Minnesota v. C.I.R., 994 F.2d 432, 436 (CA8 1993)).
     The Court finds that the language of § 861 meets its burden of clarity and that under its terms, Congress has not excluded from gross income the compensation received by the Petitioner in exchange for his personal services.
     A dynamic of this case which this court finds particularly disturbing is Petitioner's reliance upon "research" clearly not of his own enterprise. Claims of nonresident alien status, while convoluted at best, can be forgiven somewhat, when one ponders the complexities of law, and especially tax law. Petitioner's claim under § 861, however, is born only of haste in the interpretation of the provision itself. Had the author of such "research" merely taken the time to read the statute, doubtless this contention would have remained a fantasy. Negligence of this degree has, over the past twenty years, been to blame for countless victims of IRS seizures of wages, accounts receivables, and personal and real property, as well as convictions under any number of criminal tax statutes. Here, the Petitioner must share in the blame for this claim having made it to actual judicial proceedings, for it is the opinion of this court that this claim is eliminated upon the statute's first reading, as is Petitioner's leap in logic despite the language of 26 USC § 61(a). This is not the first case of this variety, and it surely will not be the last. Suffices to say, if one simply must turn to nonprofessionals for assistance, buyer beware.
     Accordingly, Petitioner is hereby ordered to comply with the Respondent's administrative summons.


1. So long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished, so long as it exists by a constitutional necessity for local purposes, though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the Union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of States, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State Governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a Federal Government.
      "The Federalist No.9, at 55 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.1961) (emphasis added) See also, "The Federalist" No.33, at 208 (A. Hamilton) ("CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of the State authority to that of the Union.")."

2. See U.S. Constitution, Amendment XVI: The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

3. See Barcroft v. CIR, (1/2/97) TC Memo 1997-5 app.dism (CA5 12/17/97) 134 F.3d 369(t), 98 USTC 50157; Lonsdale v. US, (CA10 1990) 919 F.2d 1440; US v. Mundt, (CA6 1994) 29 F.3d 233; Spoelman v. Hummel, (WD Mich unpub 5/26/89); US v. Freeman, (D NJ unpub 1993) 71 AFTR2d 1272, 93 USTC 50296 aff'd 16 F.3d 406 cert.den 511 US 1134 ("federal courts have never accepted these arguments"); Secora v. US, (D Neb unpub 4/18/97) 79 AFTR2d 2686; US v. Kitsos, (ND IL unpub 3/28/91); US v. Updegrave, (ED Penn unpub 5/28/97) 80 AFTR2d 5290, 97 USTC 50465; US v. R.L. Keys, (CA6 unpub 4/6/93) 991 F.2d 797(t); US v. Kettler, (CA10 unpub 6/3/91) 934 F.2d 326(t); In re Becraft, (CA9 1989) 885 F.2d 547; US v. Foster, [& Madge] (D Minn unpub 5/27/97); Valldejuli v. US. (SD Fla unpub 12/20/96) 78 AFTR2d 7492 (this argument "routinely" rejected); In re Angstadt, (BR. ED Penn unpub 8/17/94); Wesselman v. CIR, (2/28/96) TC Memo 1996-85; US v. Barbara Olson, (CA10 unpub 4/14/92) 961 F.2d 221(t); Eccles v. CIR, (3/2/95) TC Memo 1995-89; (federal jurisdiction supposedly limited to DC) US v. Knudson, (D Neb 1997) 959 F.Supp 1180; A.J. Barnett v. US, (CA10 unpub 9/14/93) 5 F.3d 545(t) cert.den. 510 US 1122; K.L. Anderson v. CIR, (7/8/98) TC Memo 1998-253; Powers v. CIR, (12/12/90) TC Memo 1990-623 (refuting argument that IRS can only tax in Puerto Rico and DC); In re Busby, (MD Fla unpub 10/2/98) 82 AFTR2d 6924; (this argument raised in a criminal appeal was "frivolous squared" and defendant was fined for frivolous appeal under a provision which had previously been applied only to civil appeals) US v. A.D. Cooper, (CA7 1999) 170 F.3d 691; (similarly for Securities laws) SEC v. Zubkis, (SDNY unpub 7/15/98) Fed.Sec.L.Rep 90263 recons.den (SDNY unpub 8/21/98); (similarly for Social Security) Valldejull v. Social Security Admin., (ND Fla unpub 12/20/94) 75 AFTR2d 607, CCH Unempl.Ins.Rep. 14368B; Barcraft v. CIR, (1/2/97) TC Memo 1997-5 app.dismissed (CA5 unpub 12/17/97) 134 F.3d 369(t), 81 AFTR2d 453, 98 USTC 50157; R.S. Powers v. CIR, (12/12/90) TC Memo 1990-623; (this notion is "simply wrong") US v. Sloan, (CA7 1991) 939 F.2d 499 cert.den 502 US 1060; Ross v. US, (SD Ind 1991) 793 F.Supp 180; (this argument "defies credulity") US v. R.W. Collins, (CA10 1990) 920 F.2d 619 cert.den 500 US 920; M.H. Cotton v. US, (CA10 unpub 10/14/94) 39 F.3d 1191(t), 74 AFTR2d 6778; ("simply impossible") Richey v. Indiana Dept of State Revenue, (Ind.T.C. unpub 6/3/94) 634 NE2d 1375(t); Spoelman v. Hummel, (WD Mich unpub 5/26/89); Eckert v. Lane, (WD Ark 1988) 678 F.Supp 773; In re Weatherley, (BR. E.D. Penn 1994) 169 BR 555, 25 BR Dec 1427; Christensen v. Ward, (CA10 1990) 916 F.2d 1462 cert.den 498 US 999; In re Wm.G. Walters, (Bankr., ND Ind. 1993) 166 BR 119, 71 AFTR2d 1047 (citing 26 USC sec. 7701(a)(10) for definition of United States); Skurdal v. USA, (D.Mont unpub 10/20/94) 74 AFTR2d 6918 ("not a resident of the District of Columbia ... not even a resident of nowhere"); similarly Isaacson v. US, (CA9 unpub 9/9/94) 35 F.3d 571(t), 74 AFTR2d 6354; Albers v. IRS, (D. Neb unpub 2/15/96) 77 AFTR2d 1234, 96 USTC 50197 aff'd 105 F.3d 662 cert.den 520 US 1221; US v. Ward, (CA11 1987) 833 F.2d 1538 cert.den 485 US 1022; In re Shugrue, (BR. ND Tex 1998) 221 Bankr.Rptr 394; R. Miller v. USA, (ND Ohio unpub 2/6/98); R. Miller v. Gallagher, (ND Ohio unpub 12/17/96); (tried to argue that he could sue the US without any sovereign immunity because he supposed that the US meant only the District of Columbia) Wardell v. IRS, (D Ore unpub 10/20/95) 76 AFTR2d 7290; US v. Weatherley, (ED Penn 1998) 12 F.Supp.2d 469; (this argument analyzed and debunked) Richey v. Indiana Dept of State Revenue, (Ind.T.C. 1994) 634 NE2d 1375; (tried to argue that only the [municipal] Superior Ct of DC, not a local federal court, could hear his suit against the IRS) Onkka v. Herman, (D Neb unpub 9/19/97 & 10/17/97) 80 AFTR2d 6860; "All United States citizens, irrespective of where they reside in the US, are subject to the IRC. All individuals are subject to federal income tax on wages." J.B. Smith v. US, IRS, et al., (D. Ida unpub 7/30/93); ("Nor does the seat of govt clause, US Constitution art. I, sec. 8 clause 17, provide a limitation on the exercise of federal power under the commerce clause. Rather this clause states that the federal gov't. has the full panoply of sovereign powers over those areas used for federal purposes over which states have ceded their authority. Zubkis appears to argue that federal power can only be exercised in Washington, DC, and other federal areas but not over him in California. This argument is frivolous. The clause gives the federal gov't. power over certain geographic areas. It does not prevent the federal gov't. from exercising powers under other provisions of the Constitution, such as the commerce clause, in other geographic areas." SEC v. Zubkis, (SDNY unpub 7/15/98) Fed.Sec.L.Rep 90263 recons.den (SDNY unpub 8/21/98); (tried to argue that IRS could not tax income obtained entirely in one state without interstate commerce) N.J. Wilson v. US, (D Colo unpub 5/5/98) 81 AFTR2d 2240 suit dismissed with prejudice (D Colo unpub 8/21/98) 82 AFTR2d 6239; Cox v. CIR, (CA10 unpub 10/28/96) 99 F.3d 1149(t), 78 AFTR2d 7015, 96 USTC 50598; Noah v. CIR, (CA10 unpub 7/16/98) 153 F.3d 727(t), 82 AFTR2d 5291, 98 USTC 50567; (tried to argue that income is taxable only if derived from an activity dependent on a gov't. license or which is "detrimental to the well being of a sovereign citizen") Kinkade v. CIR, (6/1/99) TC Memo 1999-180.

4. The contention that Petitioner is not a taxpayer because he is a 'free born, white, preamble, sovereign, natural, individual common law 'de jure' citizens of Kansas' is frivolous." U.S. v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746, 750-CA10 1989). See also U.S. v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (CA9 1986) (an "absolute, freeborn and natural individual" is still a "person" under the Code and thus is subject to its provisions).

5. Petitioner sets forth his residency status in the following statement:
     I, Joe Lunchbucket, declare that: I am an American inhabiting North Carolina State; I am a Non-Resident to the United States [26 USC 865(g)(1)(B)]; I have never worked for domestic corporation; I have never filed a Form 1078 or an equivalent as prescribed in 26 CFR 1.1441-5, that would rebut my non-resident status [26 CFR 1.871-4(b)]; I never had any gross income attributable to 26 CFR 872(a)(1) or (2); I am excluded from being required to obtain and submit and identifying number [26 CFR 301.6109-1(g)]; should I have income from sources within the Untied States, I am still not subject to a withholding of any kind as it is not deemed to be income. Therefore I am neither now nor ever been subject to the jurisdiction of the United States for "internal revenue." Asseveration, Declaration of Status, Dated September -- --, attached to Demand I."

6. See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1873) ("He must reside within a State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union."); Factor v. Pennington Press, Inc., 230 F.Supp. 906, 909 (N.D. Ill. 1963) ("But in order to be a citizen of a state, it is elementary law that one must first be a citizen of the United States."); Western Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 42 F.Supp. 1007, 1012 (S.D. Iowa 1941)("Under our system of government and individual citizen of a State is also a citizen of the United States...").

7. Even if the "Declaration of Status" is sufficient to relinquish Petitioner's United States nationality, the Code provides for the fully graduated taxation of all United States source income for the ten years preceding the date of such expatriation, or September 19, 1991, unless Petitioner can prove the avoidance of taxes was not one of the principal purposes for his expatriation. See Di Portanova v. U.S., 690 F.2d 169, 176-78 (Ct.Cl.1982); 26 USC § 877. hence, Petitioner's tax liability could date back as far as 1980, the first year questioned by the issued Collection Summons."

8. See U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1633, 511 U.S. 549 (1995).

9. See Carminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 485, 489-493 (1916).

10. See Hawkins v. U.S., 30 F.3d 1077, 1079 (1994).

11. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); U.S. v. Larinoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872-873 (1976); U.S. v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359 (1956); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446-447 (1936); Manhattan General Equip. Co. v. C.I.R., 297 U.S. 129, 134, 54 S.Ct. 397, 399 (1936); Tracy v. Swartout, 10 Pet. 354, 359 (1836).

12. See Carminetti v. U.S., supra, at 485, citing (on 485) Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670, 671; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 33; U.S. v. Lexington Mill and Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409; U.S. v. Bank, 234 U.S. 245, 258; Security Bank of Minnesota v. C.I.R., 994 F.2d 432, 436 (CA8 1993); Washington Red Raspberry Com'n v. U.S., 657 F.Supp. 537, 545 (1987); Forging Industry Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 748 F.2d 211, 213 (1984); Community for Creative Non-violence v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d 382, 387-91 (1988); Iglesias v. U.S., 848 F.2d 362, 367 (CA2 1988); Bank of New York v. U.S., 471 F.2d 247, 250 (CA8 1973)).

*End memorandum.

     I hope you, the reader, can see the hours of wasted time I spent rebutting a purely ignorant accusation by somebody wholly unfamiliar with my work, and who cannot see far enough to see past [research and prescriptions] that lead to destruction. Until these others have time for the law, I have no time for them, but I can't sit around and simply watch as they libel me without a clue. No disrespect intended, Gary.

David R. Myrland